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Abstract—Securing the Internet of Things, more precisely,
the ETSI Machine to Machine (M2M) architecture is a
difficult task, since there is a need to secure heterogeneous
wireless communications (cellular, wireless, wired), devices
(sensor or mobile phone) and applications (programming
language, framework, database). In this article, we present
the state of the art concerning the security ontologies in
various domains (Web, MANET, 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS, 4G/LTE,
Wi-Fi, Intrusion Detection System). Since, most of the ex-
isting security ontologies are not published online or do
not follow semantic web best practices, we have designed
the STAC (Security Toolbox: Attack & Countermeasure)
ontology-based security knowledge respecting the semantic
web guidelines. The STAC ontology, dataset and application
have been designed to help software developers or designers
to choose security mechanisms fitting their needs to secure
Internet of Things (IoT) applications. STAC is published online
(http://sensormeasurement.appspot.com/?p=stac).
Keywords-Security ontologies; Semantic Web; OWL; Inter-
net of Things; ETSI Machine to Machine (M2M); Semantic
Web of Things; 2G/GSM; 3G/UMTS; 4G/LTE; Wi-Fi; WLAN;
Security Property; Cryptography; Security Protocol; Security
Mechanism; Sensor Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
On the one hand, Internet of things (IoT) combines and
connects numerous things to the web such as sensors and
mobile phones. IoT is a broader concept than Machine to
Machine which means that machines can communicate with
each other without human intervention using the network.
The ETSI M2M architecture [4] is an European standard
composed of: (1) the M2M area networks with M2M devices
(sensor, embedded sensor or mobile phone) and M2M net-
work communications, (2) the M2M gateways which store
sensed M2M data, and (3) the M2M applications which
handle M2M data. Securing the ETSI M2M architecture is a
difficult task, since we have to secure heterogeneous wireless
communications (cellular, wireless, wired), devices (sensor
or mobile phone) and applications (programming language,
framework, database).
On the other hand, we found more 24 ontology-based
work related to sensor networks, mobile phones, cellular
networks, IDS and cryptography. We propose to exploit
these security ontologies to build a common semantic-based
security knowledge to help software designers to secure
the ETSI M2M architecture. Semantic web technologies are
more and more used to structure the data on the Web to latter
reason about them. Basic languages RDF, RDFS and OWL
are mainly used to describe triplets, for example the jamming
attack is a attack will be written as following Jamming
rdf:type Attack. Such languages enable to describe
the notion of hierarchy and enables to define new concepts
to describe your own ontology. An ontology is a vocabulary
to define main concepts and relationships between them
in a specific domain. At the beginning of this work, only
five ontologies were published online and did not follow
the semantic web guidelines. For these reasons, we build
the STAC (Security Toolbox: Attack & Countermeasure)
ontology-based security knowledge and semantic web guide-
lines are complied with. We extend our previous work the
STAC ontology [11] to build the STAC application used to
help software designers or developers to secure the ETSI
M2M architecture. The goal of this work is not to propose a
protocol for securing IoT but to build a security knowledge
base (ontology, dataset, rule) to help designers to secure their
M2M applications.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first work
proposing an ontology-based approach to help software
designers to secure the ETSI M2M architecture. Further,
there is no concrete security solutions in the OneM2M in-
ternational standard technical specification to help to secure
an Internet of Things architecture.
In this article, we firstly present the state of the art
concerning the security ontologies in various domains such
as sensors, mobile phones, web, cryptography, 2G, 3G, 4G,
Wi-Fi and IDS. We explained in section III the limitations
of existing security ontologies. We present in section IV
our contribution, the STAC (Security Toolbox: Attack &
Countermeasure) security knowledge, a hub to combine ex-
isting security ontologies according to the semantic web best
practices, more precisely, the STAC ontology, the dataset,
the prototype implementation and the evaluation. Finally, we
conclude the article.
II. EXPLOITING EXISTING SECURITY ONTOLOGIES
In this section, we present the security ontologies related
to M2M devices, M2M network communications, M2M
applications and M2M data.
A. Secure M2M devices
In this section, we present the security ontologies related
to M2M devices, more precisely, sensors, embedded sensors
or mobile phones.
1) Security Ontologies for Sensor Networks: We found
only two ontologies defining the security concepts for Wire-
less Sensor Networks. Znaidi et al. [29] propose an ontology
which defines only the classification of attacks according to
the OSI model. They describe neither well-known attacks
specific to the transport layer such as desynchronisation,
DoS and flooding nor security mechanisms, protocols and
key management specific to sensor networks. Kenfack et
al. [14] define intrusions in wireless sensor networks. They
classify vulnerabilities such as shared wireless medium,
lack of infrastructure and easy physical accessibility by the
intruders. They describe WSNs components (e.g., battery,
sensor, radio). Firstly, none of these ontologies mention sen-
sor security mechanisms and security properties. Secondly,
these ontologies are not published online.
2) Security Ontologies for Mobile Phones: Beji et al. [3]
design a security ontology for mobile applications divided
in three sub-ontologies: (1) The Asset-Vulnerability-Threat
Ontology (AVTO) to classify the vulnerabilities into three
main classes: physical, software and those related to com-
munications, (2) the Mobile Profile Ontology (MPO) and (3)
the Defense Mechanism Ontology (DMO) which describes
main security and cryptographic mechanisms such as digital
signature, locking mechanism, encryption, key management,
PKI, access control methods, algorithm and those specific
to the mobile field (SIM locking). Vincent et al. [27] design
an ontology-based firewall to ensure privacy protection for
smartphones. They propose two ontologies: the former to
represent the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL)1 pri-
vacy policies, inspired by the SOUPA framework, and the
latter the digital identity on smartphones using well-known
ontologies FOAF2 and VCard3. None of these ontologies
are published online. The ontology [1] covers the domain of
security in the field of mobile applications.
B. Secure M2M network communications
Several security ontologies have been found related to
network communication, more precisely, cellular networks
(2G, 3G, 4G) and Wi-Fi. They mainly describe security
mechanisms in the physical and link OSI model layer.
1http://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/
2http://xmlns.com/foaf/spec/
3http://www.w3.org/TR/vcard-rdf/
1) Security Ontologies for Cellular Networks: Neji et al.
define an ontology describing the architecture of cellular
networks and the associated security mechanisms: Long
Term Evolution (LTE)/4G [17], Universal Mobile Telecom-
munications System (UMTS)/3G [18] and Global System
for Mobile Communication (GSM)/2G [19]. Alazeib et al.
[2] develop an ontology for generic wireless authentication
to describe GSM, UMTS and wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN) network architecture, more precisely the Wi-Fi
technlogy. Authentication mechanisms applied to these tech-
nologies are also presented.
2) Security Ontologies for Intrusion Detection Systems:
Joshi, Undercoffer et al. [13] [25] design the Intrusion De-
tection System ontology with classes such as Vulnerability,
Product, Attack properties and Weakness. This ontology is
used to convert the National Vulnerability database (NVD)
into RDF. They are compliant with Linked Data principle
but not Linked Open Vocabularies principles. Tsoumas et al.
[24] define security mechanisms such as firewall, antivirus
and network protocols. Frye et al. [9] design the attach
ontology to identify complex network attacks. Salahi et al.
[22] design an ontology to predict networks attacks.
C. Secure M2M applications and M2M data
We present security ontologies describing cryptographic
concepts and usual security mechanisms.
1) General Security Ontologies: Souag et al. [23] review
numerous security ontologies and underline that are not
published online but do not explain that most of the existing
works do not follow the semantic web best practices. Kim et
al. [15] create seven ontologies. The main security ontology
describes security concepts such as security objectives (e.g.
authentication) and network security protocols (e.g., IPSec,
SSL). Another ontology describes symmetric and asymmet-
ric algorithms, hash algorithms, key exchange algorithms
and digital signatures. Herzog et al. [12] implement four
ontologies defining several concepts such as assets, threats,
vulnerabilities and security mechanisms. They propose some
security mechanisms such as asymmetric and symmetric
algorithms that are classified into block cipher or stream
cipher. They propose also some secure network communi-
cation protocols such as SSL, SSH, VPN, security goals
(authentication, integrity, confidentiality) and access control
model (RBAC, MAC, DAC). Denker [6] [5] create two on-
tologies called ’security mechanisms’ and ’credential’. They
propose the notion of security notations to represent security
properties such as authentication or confidentiality. They also
define different authentication methods: certificate-based,
password-based, biometrics (fingerprints, voice) and physi-
cal components (e.g., card). MASO [16] is an ontology writ-
ten in French and defines symmetric/asymmetric algorithms,
hash function, security goals and security mechanisms such
as firewall and antivirus. Vorobiev et al. [28] define several
ontologies: (1) Security Attack Ontology (SAO), (2) Security
Defence Ontology (SDO), (3) Security Asset-Vulnerability
Ontology (SAVO), (4) Security Algorithm-Standard Ontol-
ogy (SASO), and (5) Security Function Ontology (SFO).
Evesti et al. [8] design an ontology de describe and check
the age or structure of the password and the authentication
level.
2) Security Ontologies for Web Applications: Fenz et
al. [7] propose the AURUM framework, an ontology-based
security knowledge. They do not classify security mech-
anisms and attacks according to the technologies. Razzaq
et al. [21] classify web application attacks such as cookie
poisoning, SQL injection, Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and
proposed SWRL rules. Huang et al. [?] design an ontology-
based malware bahavioral analysis called Taiwan Malware
Analysis Net (TWMAN). They define the malware ontology
with concepts such as trojan, backdoor, worm.
III. LIMITATIONS OF THE SECURITY ONTOLOGIES
We explain that most of the existing security ontologies
cannot be reused since they are not published online or do
not follow the semantic web best practices.
A. Lack of unify terms
The main drawback of these ontologies is that they
use different names for the same concepts which can
confuse a software developer which is not expert in
security. For example, we found several terms Goal,
SecurityNotation, SecurityObjective in
these ontologies for defining the same concept, that we call
SecurityProperty to represent Confidentiality,
Integrity, Authentication, etc.
This is the case for numerous concepts:
AsymmetricAlgorithm/PublicKeyAlgorithm,
HashFunction/HashAlgorithm, etc.
B. Incomplete Security Knowledge
Most of these ontologies are domain specific, since they
are focused on sensor networks, IDS, etc. To design a tool
to help software designers to choose security mechanisms
to secure IoT applications, we need to gather all of these
security knowledge bases. Existing security ontologies are
incomplete, they do not:
• Classify both threats and security mechanisms accord-
ing to the technologies (Sensor, Cellular, Wireless,
Web, Machine-to-Machine, etc.)
• Classify attacks and security mechanisms according to
the OSI model.
• Indicate security mechanisms prevent threats.
• Describe strengths and weaknesses of security mecha-
nisms. The developer needs more information to help
him to choose the right security mechanisms. For
example, WEP, WPA1 and WPA2 are several security
mechanisms to secure the Wi-Fi communication. The
developer wants to know that WPA2 replaces previous
security mechanisms: WEP and WPA1 because they are
deprecated.
• Explain that security mechanisms are composed of
other security mechanisms, i.e., the Virtual Private
Network (VPN) is a security mechanism which uses the
IPSec protocol and the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
key management.
• Specify the relationships between security mechanisms
and security properties, i.e., the Secure Shell (SSH)
satisfies the authentication, integrity and confidentiality
properties.
C. Lack of Semantic Web Best Practices
Unfortunately, semantic experts are not aware of semantic
web best practices and semantic tools to reference their on-
tologies or datasets. Most of the existing security ontologies:
• Are not published online.
• Are not linked to existing security ontologies for similar
concepts.
• Do not differentiate the ontology and the dataset
• Are not referenced on the Linked Open Vocabularies4
catalogue.
D. Summary
The presented ontologies have been created without con-
sidering other existing ontologies and cannot be reused since
they are not published online or do not follow the semantic
web best practices. To facilitate the developer tasks, we
create our own ontology, called STAC (Security ToolBox:
Attacks & Countermeasure) to unify the terms, to gather
security concepts in a same knowledge base and to publish
online the security knowledge according to the semantic web
best practices.
IV. STAC (SECURITY TOOLBOX: ATTACK &
COUNTERMEASURE): THE PROPOSED SEMANTIC-BASED
SECURITY APPROACH
We have been inspired by the exiting security ontolo-
gies to design an ontology-based security knowledge called
STAC (Security Toolbox: Attack & Countermeasure) [11]
respecting the semantic web guidelines. This security knowl-
edge is a hub to link existing security ontologies [1] [15]
[16] published online and has been validated by the semantic
web community. The STAC knowledge base enables to link
security ontologies together as depicted in the Figure 1.
The purpose of the STAC ontology and dataset is to
help developers and project managers to secure the IoT-
based applications to ensure ’security by design’ from the
beginning of the project.
4http://lov.okfn.org/dataset/lov/
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Figure 1. The STAC knowledge base
A. Semantic Web Guidelines
We share the lessons learned and remind in this section
the semantic web best practices that we acquired through
this work for the next designers of security ontologies.
Security experts should share their ontologies, datasets
and rules on the semantic web tools.
• Reference domain ontologies on the LOV catalogue5
[26] and the semantic search engines such as Watson
and Swoogle.
• Reference domain datasets on the DataHub project6 and
on semantic search engines such as Sindice7.
• Reference domain rules on the Linked Open Rules 8
which is still a work in progress.
1) Semantic guidelines:
• To have your ontology referenced on LOV:
– Share online your ontology
– The name of the ontology (namespace) and the
location of the ontology are the same (URI defer-
encable).
– Add the metadata descriptions proposed by LOV
[26] (rights, authors, licenses)
– Add the properties rdfs:label and
rdfs:comment at least in english and in
another language if needed.
– Add the property owl:equivalentClass with
the common class already described and referenced
by LOV.
– If you encounter errors when submitting on
LOV, check you ontology on Vapour9 and
TripleChecker10
5http://lov.okfn.org/dataset/lov/
6http://datahub.io/fr/
7http://sindice.com/
8http://www.sensormeasurement.appspot.com/?p=rule
9http://validator.linkeddata.org/vapour
10http://graphite.ecs.soton.ac.uk/checker/
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Figure 2. The top level part of the STAC ontology
• Follow the semantic web best practices to design your
ontology [20] and the OOPS project11 to detect com-
mon ontology pitfalls.
• Use the Linked Data principles12 to create a well-
designed RDF dataset.
We describe all semantic bad practices encountered and
the related guidelines to remedy them in a draft document
[10] for the OneM2M international standard.
B. STAC ontology & dataset
The STAC ontology describes main security and
cryptographic concepts in various security domains
such as sensor, cellular, wireless, web, IDS and
network management. The main goal is to suggest
the best security mechanism to design a secure
application. To perform this task, we define the
STAC ontology specifying relationships between
Attack, SecurityMechanism, Technology,
SecurityProperty and the OSIModel (Figure 2). In
the STAC ontology, we link common security concepts
(e.g., EncryptionAlgorithm) to other existing security
ontologies published online presented in the section 3.
A Technology is vulnerable to Attack
(hasVulnerability property) and has specific
SecurityMechanism (isProtectedBy property. An
example, is that all wireless technologies have the Jamming
attack in common due to the wireless communication,
which is not the case for wired networks. We define a
great deal of technologies and the related instances in
the STAC knowledge base: NetworkManagement,
Web (ProgrammingLanguage, Ecommerce,
Frameworks, Databases), wired (Ethernet) and
wireless networks: SensorNetwork, M2M, Wi-Fi,
GSM (2G), UMTS (3G), LTE (4G), etc.
11http://oeg-lia3.dia.fi.upm.es/webOOPS/index-content.jsp
12http://linkeddata.org/
A Technology can be replaced by another technology
more recent (isReplacedBy property). This is the case
for cellular technologies: the GSM technology has been
replaced by the GPRS technology.
We classify Attack according to the OSIModelLayer
and the Technology. For example, the Jamming at-
tack occurs in the PhysicalLayer and is specific to
SensorNetwork whereas the SQLInjection occurs
in the ApplicationLayer and is dedicated to Web
applications.
We have referenced numerous technologies, attacks and
security mechanisms according to the OSI model.
In the STAC ontology, we specify restrictions be-
tween attacks and the security mechanisms. For ex-
ample, SensorAttack can exclusively be protected
by SensorSecurityMechanism and WebAttack by
WebSecurityMechanism: the VPN (Virtual Private Net-
work) security mechanism is a web security mechanism and
so cannot thwart sensor attacks.
The OSIModel concept is a collection of seven
OSIModelLayer concepts which are {Physical,
Link, Network, Transport, Session,
Presentation, Application}Layer.
SecurityProperty is a concept that gives more
information about security mechanisms. We describe
thirteen security properties (e.g., Confidentiality,
Authentication, Integrity,
AccessControl, NonRepudiation), etc. to indicate
that security mechanisms satisfy some of these security
properties. For example, VPN satisfies the authentication,
the confidentiality and the integrity properties.
SecurityMechanism is used to protect
Application against specific Attack, they can be:
(1) SecurityTool such as NetworkSecurityTool
(Wireshark), WifiAttackTool (WepCrack),
MessageEncryptionTool (PGP), Proxies,
Sniffers (2) SecurityProtocol which are
classified by technologies: WebSecurityProtocol
(HTTPS) SensorSecurityProtocol (SPINS,
TinySec, LLSP, MiniSec, ContiSec)
WifiSecurityProtocol: (WPA2), and (3)
CryptographicConcept: HashFunction (SHA),
DigitalSignature (RSA), KeyManagement
(IKE), AsymmetricAlgorithm (RSA, ECC)
and SymmetricAlgorithm which are split into:
BlockCipher (AES) and StreamCipher (RC4).
Numerous instances of security mechanisms are defined
such as PGP, IDS, Firewall, Proxy, DMZ, ACL.
A SecurityMechanism can be itself composed of
other security mechanisms. For example, the VPN security
mechanism is composed of (dcterms:hasPart property)
the IKE key management and the IPSec protocol which
are both security mechanisms. Technologies are protected
by specific security mechanisms. Indeed, sensor security
mechanisms are devoted to secure the sensor technology,
Wi-Fi security mechanisms protect Wi-Fi technologies, etc.
A SecurityMechanism can be replaced by another
more secured (isReplacedBy property). An example is
that in Wi-Fi technologies, the WEP security mechanism has
been replaced by WPA1 which has been replaced by WPA2.
To help developers to choose the best security mechanism,
there is a need to differentiate them by indicating their
strengths and weaknesses. We design the concept called
Feature to fulfill this need. The Feature concept
is composed of several properties: Free, Flexible,
Scalable, Secured, LowCostDeployment,
LowEnergyConsuming, ExchangeKeyEasy and
SuitableHeterogeneousCommunication. Hence,
we can indicate that an AsymmetricAlgorithm
is HighEnergyConsuming, but propose an easy
solution to exchange keys (ExchangeKeyEasy). A
SymmetricAlgorithm is LowEnergyConsuming,
however, exchanging the keys is not an easy task. Another
example is the difficult task to secure communications due
to various protocols: there are three main security protocols
to secure Wi-Fi communications: WEP, WPA1 and WPA2,
the latter is the most secured security mechanism.
C. Prototype implementation
We present in this section the architecture and technolo-
gies used to implement both the STAC ontology/dataset
and the STAC user interface. To demonstrate the feasibility
of the proposed ontology, we develop the user interface
in J2EE, use the Google Application Engine (GAE) and
propose Web services REST (the Jersey implementation).
The user interface is implemented with HTML5, CSS3,
JavaScript and AJAX technologies. We used semantic web
technologies to represent the STAC ontology and dataset:
RDF, RDFS, and OWL. The STAC ontology has been
referenced by the LOV (Linked Open Vocabularies) project.
The Jena framework13 is used to manage semantic data and
the SPARQL language to perform the queries.
The ontology-based STAC application has been created
to help the developers to design a secure IOT application.
Developers look for information to secure their applications,
using the user interface that we have developed. Our appli-
cation, published online14 proposes a menu composed of:
• STAC template. Users choose a specific technology and
STAC displays all related attacks, security mechanisms,
properties satisfied and features (Figure 3).
• The cryptography web page with encryption algo-
rithms, hash functions, digital signatures, mode of
operations and key managements (Figure 4).
• The security property web page and their methods.
• The attack and security mechanism interface contain-
ing threats, and their security mechanisms classified
13http://jena.apache.org/
14http://www.sensormeasurement.appspot.com/
Figure 3. STAC template
according the OSI model and the technologies (Figure
5).
• The sensor network web page that explains sensor
protocols, sensor attacks, sensor security mechanisms
and sensor key managements (Figure 6).
• The security for communication network web pages
with GSM (2G), GPRS (2.5G), UMTS (3G), Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, Wimax, Machine-to-Machine (M2M) and
Mesh networks.
In Figure 3, the developer chooses a technology (e.g.,
WiFi), all related attacks are display (e.g., Steal NIC) and the
security mechanisms specific to the WiFi technology. Then,
the developer chooses a security mechanism (e.g., WPA2) to
obtain additional information: the security property satisfied
(e.g., authentication) and the features (e.g., secured).
Figure 4 shows main cryptographic concepts. It explains
that the encryption algorithm is either a symmetric or
asymmetric, and the tooltip teaches that keys used in an
asymmetric algorithm are different for encryption and de-
cryption, allowing for easier key distribution. An instance of
an asymmetric algorithm can be RSA. Symmetric algorithms
can be either stream cipher (e.g., RC6) or block cipher (e.g.,
AES). The interface displays also hash functions (SHA),
digital signatures (DSS), mode of operation (CBC) and key
management (Diffie Hellman) by using a drop-down list.
The interface depicted in Figure 5 displays all attacks
and proposes the security mechanisms to thwart them. For
example, to thwart the eavesdropping attack, we propose
the HTTPS security mechanism. A click on the drop-down
list also proposes authentication method, directional antenna,
encryption algorithm, and the VPN security mechanisms.
We also indicate for security mechanisms the security
properties satisfied and their features. The VPN satisfies
the authentication, integrity, confidentiality, access control,
privacy and authorization properties and features are low
cost deployment and secured. In the OSI model section are
classified all attacks and all security mechanisms according
to the OSI model layer: the SQL injection occurs in the
application layer, the PGP security mechanism protects the
application layer, etc.
The interface as depicted in Figure 6 focuses on security
Figure 4. The cryptography interface
Figure 5. The attacks and security mechanisms interface
for sensor networks: sensor attacks and their security mech-
anisms. This interface indicates which security algorithms
are used in sensor protocols (the SPINS sensor protocol is
composed of (dcterms:hasPart property) the RC6 algorithm).
The cryptography interface indicates that RC6 is a stream
cipher algorithm which is a symmetric algorithm and so an
encryption algorithm. With the help of the security property
interface, we know that the encryption algorithm is a con-
fidentiality method and satisfies the confidentiality property.
We also indicate sensor key managements: the LEAP sensor
Figure 6. The sensor networks interface
key management is composed of (dcterms:hasPart property)
four keys: pairwise key, cluster key, group key and individual
key. A tooltip gives more information of all concepts: the
definition of threats or security mechanisms. A click on each
drop-down list shows all sensor protocols, sensor attacks,
etc. The software developer who needs information about
security in sensor networks goes directly to this interface.
D. Evaluation
At the beginning of this work, only 5 ontologies were
published online and did not follow the semantic web guide-
lines. At the time of writing this paper, we have referenced
24 ontologies as following:
• 7 ontologies are not available yet. The authors do
not reply to our email to publish online the ontology
according to the semantic web best practices.
• 14 ontology are online, 10 do not follow the semantic
guidelines yet, but 4 ontologies follow the semantic
guidelines and are referenced by LOV.
• 1 ontology has been lost.
• 2 will be published online soon according to the au-
thors.
The STAC ontology and dataset has been evaluated and
accepted by the semantic web community since they are
referenced by the LOV project. The STAC hub is linked
to 4 security ontologies which respect the semantic web
guidelines and are now referenced by LOV too thanks to our
work. We validate the STAC knowledge base with semantic
web tools such as RDF validator15, RDF Triple-Checker16
and fixing some errors with the Oops project17 and Vapour18.
15http://www.w3.org/RDF/Validator/
16http://graphite.ecs.soton.ac.uk/checker/
17http://oeg-lia3.dia.fi.upm.es/oops/index-content.jsp
18http://validator.linkeddata.org/vapour
The LOV project ask us to contribute to their project since
we have explored the ontology-based security domain and
other ones related to Internet of Things which were not
referenced yet.
Further, we referenced all semantic bad practices and
proposed the related guidelines in a draft document [10]
for the oneM2M international standard for the technical
semantic web part.
We sent a Google form19 to fill to developers and re-
searchers in computer science to test the STAC application:
We obtained 28 responses20 as following:
• 10 persons found the STAC application useful, 1 not,
and 17 did not well understood the usability. We have
to improve the user interface and the explanations.
• 20 were interested to know security related to wireless
networks, WiFi 3G, 4G, Sensors. This is why we
extended the STAC security knowledge base with new
domains such as wireless networks, network manage-
ment, mobile application, cloud e-commerce, web, etc.
SPARQL queries request the STAC knowledge base to
return the needed information though the web services and
the GUI.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have presented a great deal of security
ontologies to help software designers to choose security
mechanisms to secure the ETSI M2M architecture, more
precisely the IoT applications. We have been inspired by
these ontologies to build an ontology-based security knowl-
edge, called STAC, applied to numerous technologies and
define the related attacks, security mechanisms, security
properties, features, etc. The STAC ontology and dataset
respect the semantic web best practices and are published
online. The STAC application enables the developers to look
for information to secure their sensor-based IOT application.
As future work, we intent to automatically update this
security knowledge base through a Google form, which will
be automatically converted as instances in the STAC dataset.
Another step will be to automatically integrate the security
mechanism (e.g., AES using Java security API). Another
future work will be to design a tool to automatically improve
security ontologies according to the best practices.
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